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IN THE SUPREHE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARION H. BECKSTROM, ) 
) 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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_____________________________) 
) 
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Cross Defendants and Respondants, VERE BECKSTROM 
and ELIZABETH S. RECKSTROM, hereinafter referred to as "VERE 
BECKSTROH", reply to the points of Cross Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, hereinafter referred to as "LAUB" as follows: 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN RULING TiiA~ DEFENDANT, CROSS PLAINTIFF 
AND APPELLANT NORMAND Do LAUB HAD A DUTY 
TO INVESTIGATE THE STATUS OF TITLE TO THE 
PROPERTY, AND THAT HE BREACHED A DUTY IN 
NOT so DOINGO 
Though the Cross Plaintiffs and Appellants believe 
they had no obligation to investigate the status of the 
title of the property purchased from VERE BECKSTROM, the 
Court IE low ruled that they were sufficiently negligent in 
failing to do so to justify a mitigation of the damages 
av;arded to them" 
In claiming that the trial court erred, LAUB cites 
Marlowe Investment Corporation vso Radrnall, Leavitt vso 
Blohm, Hoodard vs 0 Allen and Naylor vs 0 Jolley, all of which 
address themselves to the proposition that a vendor need not 
necessarily have a good and clear title at the time the 
contract of sale is made but rather, it is only necessary 
at the time provided for conveyance under the contract. 
VERE BECKSTROM does not argue the validity of 
that principal of law" However, VERE BECKSTROM does submit 
that LAUB has confused the issue that is actually involved. 
The Court below did not address itself to the time that 
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VERE BECKSTROM is obligated to deliver clear title, but 
rather to the negligence of LAUB in failing to determine 
under the facts of this case, that, at the very least, there 
was another claimant of an interest in the property, one 
other than VERE BECKSTROMo 
Section 57-l-6 of the Utah Code Annotated provides 
for the recordation of instruments of conveyance in the 
County Recorder's office of the county in which the property 
is situated. 
Crompton vso Jenson, 78 U 55, l P2d 242, provides 
that one who deals with real property is charged ~.;rith notice 
of what is shown by the records of the County Recorder of the 
county in which the property is situated. 
Hayes vs. Gibbs, llO U 54, 169 P2d 781, in discussi 
restrictive covenants appearing of record in the Recorder's 
office, quotes 66 CoJ. P 1128 §962, which states: 
"A purchaser of land is chargeable ~vith notice 
of all conditions, restrictions, exceptions, 
or reservations appearing in his claim of 
title, or concerning which he is put on 
inquiry. '~''<o~" 
In Davis vs. Kleindienst, 169 P2d 78, an Arizona 
case, the Court, on page 83, says: 
"The law seems to be settled that a person 
who fails to exercise due diligence which 
is within his reach is not a bona fide 
purchaser." 
In the Davis case, Supra, after noting that the 
record showed numerous acts of obvious ownership, then added 
Page Tw6 
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" .. "were all matters which at least were 
sufficient to put the Defendant upon notice 
to make an inquiry" Any reasonable inquiry 
would have resulted in the disclosure that 
Plaintiff claimed the tract in question. 
(Ernphas~s Added) 
LAUE may argue that the recording statutes are 
only to protect the purchaser against third parties and not 
from the error or mistake, or even dishonesty of a vendor. 
However, the cases all indicate that a recorded interest 
is notice to all people of, at least a claim and under the 
circumstances of the instant case, it appears that it would 
be carelessness, at least, and probably outright negligence 
for LAUE, being charged with notice of HARION BECKSTROM's 
claims, (by virtue of his being shown in the Recorder's 
office as a joint owner of the property with VERE BECKSTROM 
tir" 7, 118-l~ ) not to have made inquiry of MARION BECKSTROH 
as to 'lhether he in fact claimed an interest in the property. 
LAUB was well aware that MARION had occupied and farmed the 
property for an extended period of time (Tr. 80, 1125-28) 
and that knowledge together with the imputed knowledge that 
MARIO!l !ECKSTROM was shown as a tenant in common with VERE 
BECKSTROM, by virtue of the record, should have caused him 
to make an inquiry. 
1AUB may no doubt insist that, as mentioned before, 
such imputed knowledge only protects HARION BECKSTROM from 
losinr, his interest by VERE BECKSTR011' s purported sale to 
LALJR Ps indicated in Appellant's Brief, VERE BECKSTROM 
c 
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felt MARION BECKSTROM had abandoned his interest and by 
his acts would be estopped from assertinp, any claim to the 
property so that he, VERE BECKSTROM, was perfectly free to 
sell the property to LAUB. Hmvever, assuming the Court 
rules .:gainst VERE BECKSTROl1 on that issue, then VERE 
BECKSTROM was wrong and he could not convey at least one-
half of the property to LAUB. 
It would appear only logical, reasonable and 
equitable that LAUB had some responsibility to determine, 
when the record showed MARION a tenant in common with VERE, 
that that may well be the case; and make any inquiry of both 
MARION and VERE. If, after that inquiry he determined to 
gamble upon VERE being correct in his assumption that t1ARION 
no longer had a legal or equitable interest in the property, 
he would have done so with full understandinp, of the risk 
he was taking. 
The cases say LAUB is charged with knowledge of 
the status of the recorded title and if he did not inquire 
of the record, or make an investigation of the circumstance 
surrounding the information found in the record, he must 
suffer the consequences. 
In the situation of the instant case, Cross Defendat 
and !ppellants, VERE and ELIZABETH BECKSTROM, submit that eve 
though they believed the trial court to have been in error ir 
not finding that the factor of an equitable estoppel existed 
Page Fotr 
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against !1ARION BECKSTROM's claim, they do sincerely submit 
that the trial court did not err in finding, under the 
circumstances, that LAUB had a duty to make an inquiry 
into the status of the title (especially in view of the 
status of the record title and LAUE's own personal knowledge 
of the circumstances of the property in question) and that 
having failed to do so is prohibitive to him from entitlement 
to the unreasonable and almost confiscatory claim against 
VERE BECKSTROl1 which he makes in demanding that, not only 
should VERE BECKSTROM forfeit any interest in the property, 
but pay LAUB damages in an amount in excess of $19,000.00. 
POINT II 
TilE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER HEASURE OF 
DA!1AGES AND FAILED TO AWARD TO APPELLANTS 
LAUB, DA!1AGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $19,767.13. 
LAUB argues in his Brief that because the property 
in question has had an amazing record of appreciation in 
value from $20,000.00 in December, 1972 (Tr. 96, LL23-26) 
to $70,000.00 in March, 1977 (Tr. 97, LL20-28) he should be 
entitled to one-half of the current market value of the 
property in damages against VERE BECKSTROM if VERE BECKSTROM 
cannot deliver title to the entire parcel. That amounts to 
total damages to VERE BECKSTROM of loss of one-half of the 
property to HARION BECKSTROl1, and loss of. the other half 
to LAUE plus the sum of $35,100.00, or over $15,000.00 more 
than LAUB contracted to pay VERE BECKSTR0!1 just 5 years ago 
Page Fi{re 
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for all of the property. 
LAUB cites B1.llmell vs. Bills, 368 P2d 597, 13 Utah 
2d 83, md Andreason vs. Hansen, 335 P2d 4011, 8 Utah 2d 370, 
as the law in Utah--the point being that the purchaser is 
entitled to the "benefit of his bargain". 
Certainly the Bunnell case Supra and the Andreason 
case Supra would seem to suggest that to be the law in Utah, 
77 Am Jur 2d 648, Vendor and Purchaser ~519, as citE 
by LAUB states the principal as follows: 
" ••• these statements are substantiallY the 
same in effect and resultes in giving" the 
purchaser as damages ·the benefit of his 
bargain, in case the land is worth more 
than the price agreed upon." 
However, Am Jur qualifies that somewhat by continuir. 
"This is very generally recognized where 
the vendor cannot be said to have acted in 
good faith, as where, after the making of 
the contract disables himself by his own 
act or neglect from being able to convey, 
or where, having the ability to do so, he 
refuses to convey because of an advance 
in the value of the land or otherwise, 
or where he had knowledge of his want of 
or the defects in his title. Hhen, however, 
the vendor has acted in good faith but is 
unable to carry out the contract because 
of some defect in the title. recover¥ b¥ 
the purchaser for loss of his bargaln lS 
denied by the weight of authority." 
(Emphasis Added) 
Section 522 of the same treatise expounds upon that 
theme as follows: 
"in many jurisdiction, when the vendor 
is unable to convey, a distinction is 
made regarding the general damages 
Page Si'X 
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The Bunnell case, Supra says, pertaining to the 
issue of damages, merely, 
"The measure of damages where the vendor 
has breached a land sale contract is the 
market value of the property at the time 
of the breach less the contract price to 
the vendee." 
Nothing more is said concerning the theory of 
that pronouncement. No analysis of the rationale of that 
determination is made. Nothing is said in the case about 
whether that pricipal is hard and fast or whether it applies 
only where the vendor did not act in good faith. However, 
the facts, in that case, were such that would certainly 
have justified the Court in finding that the vendor did not 
act in good faith and the Court's decision might well be 
assumed to have been predicated upon that circumstance 
even though it did not enunciate a distinction based upon 
bad faith of the vendor in the body of its opinion. 
The Bunnell case merely cited for authority the 
Page Se'len 
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Andreason case, Supra, However, even though the Andreason 
case did say, 
The proper measure of damages vwuld be the 
difference between the Defendant's offer 
and the actual market value of the property,.," 
it was done without citation of authority or analysis of 
any kind. Nevertheless, the Court, in that case, did spend 
much of its written opinion discussin~ improprieties on the 
part of the vendor and finally decided the case, actually, 
upon the narrow issue of liquidated damages. 
VERE BECKSTROM respectfully submits that neither 
the Bunnell nor the Andreason cases, Supra stand solidly 
for the principal that regardless of the circ~stances the 
purchaser is entitled to the "benefit of his bargain" in 
Utah. Rather, it is respectfully submitted that the precise 
issue of whether the ~inciple applies only when the vendor 
acts in bad faith is still open in Utah, 
Assuming that issue is open, the instant case wou!C 
seem to provide an excellent example why the law should make 
a distinction between the situation where a vendor acts in 
bad faith and where he acts in good faith. 
An early Washington State case, Morgan vs, Bell, 
3 \lash. 554, 28 P 925, provides an excellent analysis, 
commencing on page 932, of the arguments pro and con and 
concludes the better rule is that one who acts in good faith 
is entitled to a mitigation of damages as opposed to a vend~ 
-
", 
' 
' 
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1vho does not act in good faitho 
On page 933, the Court notes, after referring to 
several cases: 
"In these cases the line has been repeatedly 
drawn between parties acting in good faith, 
and failing to perform because they could 
not make a title, and parties Hhose conduct 
is tainted with fraud or bad faith," 
After a fairly lengthy discussion of the cases, the 
Court illustrated why it adopted the rule that it did: 
"The case at bar aptly illustrates the 
injustice which the eminent Justice sought 
to prevent, If Plaintiff's allegations 
are true, the contract was for sale of 
lands which in December were worth $20,000,00 
and m April following were worth $150,000.00; 
and the result is that for the pitiful sum of 
$500.00 the Defendant, who was acting in 
perfect good faith, is called upon to yield 
up $134,500.00 in response to Plaintiff's 
investment of $500.00 for four months. If 
such a rule were adopted in this western 
country, where what is cheap agricultural 
or farming land one year is valuable city 
property the next and where the laws by reason 
of the formative condition of the state, are 
unsettled and unadjudicated, a conveyance of 
land would be a perilous transaction, which 
a prudent man might well hesitate to engage 
in." 
The same might be said about a time when inflation 
causes rapid appreciation in land values or in which ever 
increasing scarcity of water creates enormous increases in 
value of otherwise valueless land which is lucky enough to 
have a vater right appurtenant to it, as is the situation in 
the instant case. 
Though the situation is not quite as extreme in 
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this case as the example provided in the Horgan case Supra, 
nevertheless, it does point up a severe hardship that may be 
imposed upon a vendor who cannot provide title at fue time 
provided for conveyance, if the Bunnell and Andreason cases 
are interpreted to establish the law in Utah as disregarding 
good faith on the part of the vendor in mitigation of damages. 
The final point is, of course, necessarily that the 
vendors, in this case, VERE BECKSTROl1 and ELIZABETH BECKSTRo:·, 
must be found to have acted in good faith in selling to LAUB. 
It is respectfully urged that regardless of the 
outcome of the appeal in this case by VERE BECKSTROM from the 
judgment below a1varded against him and to l1ARION BECKSTROI1, 
VERE BECKSTROM certainly did not act fraudulently or in sud. 
patent bad faith as to justify the penalty that awaits him 
if LAUB were to be successful in his appealo 
To illustrate the good faith of VEPill BECKSTROM, 
one would have to reiterate the entire appeal brief previous!:-
submitted by him dealing with the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel and he does respectfully refer the Court to that ~~ 
Brief. 
Suffice it to say that VERE BECKSTROl1, not being 
educated in the niceties of the law, added up the many factor' 
before him: his having paid almost the entire cost of the 
land; his brother having abandoned it many years before; 
VERE, himself, having paid all the taxes on it, both before 
and after l1ARION's abandonment of it; his having provided 
-
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improvements (digging a new well, among others); VERE 
having operated it for several years until his stroke 
prevented him from doing so any longer after MARION aban-
doned it; his having thereafter taken the responsibility 
of leasing it; MARION having earlier tried to get him to 
sell it, simply to avoid losing it by foreclosure as vas 
done with companion property obtained under similar 
circumstances; and finally, MARION having refused to pay 
additional taxes when due with knowledge of what the possible 
consequences of failure to pay them would be (Tr. 30, LLl0-13) 
and at least, according to VERE; saying "Let the state 
take it for taxes". All of these factors led VERE to believe, 
rightly or wrongly, that he was at that time the sole owner 
of the property and had every right to sell the property and 
convey good title to it to LAUB. 
If VERE BECKSTROM was wrong, he will be advised by 
this Court he was wrong, depending upon the results of his 
appeal against the judgment awarded below to !>ARION BECKSTROM, 
but even if that be the result, it hardly seems a case where 
one might say his act of selling the property in question to 
LAUB was not done in good faith and that consequently not 
only must he lose his investment in money, time and hard 
effort which he has made in the property over many years, but 
must also pay out of his pocket to LAUB an additional $19,767.13 
in Hhat can only be characterized as punitive damages against 
him, 
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TI1is seems particularly true when, as the Court 
below found, LAUB had a duty of inquiring and investigating 
and thereby determining the status of the title, 
It would be the best of two worlds if he could 
say to himself, "I know there is another claimant of an 
interest in the property, but I won't do anything about it 
to protect myself. If that claimant's interest turns out 
to be valid, I'll at least get my money back plus interest 
out of the: seller, but if the price should appreciate in 
the rneanti,!1le, I'll get damages from him as well. So I 
can't lose'!" 
··one should not be able to stand idly by, in the 
::, 
face of nqt;.;ice of a possible problem and make an exhorbitant 
., 
profit out of that inaction. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND 
• COHMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY A\JARDING 
~.PPELLANTS LAUB ONLY $500.00 FOR THE 
~!~RVICES OF THEIR ATTORNEY. 
LAUB argues that the Court below abused its dis-
cretion in a>varding the sum of $500.00 rather than $800.00 
as reques~ed by him. 
'~~ 
20 Am. Jur. 65, Costs ~78 states that: 
"In the absence of an abuse of discretion, 
the amount awarded by the trial court as 
an attorney's fee will not be disturbed,---" 
The Court below had the advantage of knowledge of 
the ~ngth of the trial, of observing counsel, reviewing th 
pleadings ,j;d having an intimate understanding of tl1c s<·rvi 
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accordingly. 
VERE BECKSTROt1, in good faith, believed his brother 
1vould not claim the property - even that his brother, MARION, 
in fact, had no legal right to an interest in the property 
even if he did later claim an interest. But in spite of 
VERE BECKSTROM's judgment, LAUB certainly had some obligation 
to determine whether or not that judgment was reliable. He 
should not simply sit back and benefit from VERE BECKSTROM's 
mistake, if, indeed, it was a mistake, when he himself had 
an opportunity and a duty to make his own inquiry and judgment. 
The Cross Defendants submit that there was, at 
least, sufficient obligation on LAUE's part to mitigate the 
amount of damages if not sufficient to exonerate them entirely. 
Furthermore, the Cross Defendants and Respondants 
submit that the apparent holding of the Bunnell and Andreason 
cases, Supra, should be clarified and refined to establish 
the law in Utah to be that the vendor is entitled to "the 
benefit of his bargain" only when the vendor acts in bad 
faith, as has been expounded by many cases throughout the 
nation on the subject. 
Should the judgment against VERE BECKSTROM in 
favor of MARION BECKSTROM be upheld by the Court, VERE BECKSTROM 
then urges that this honorable court either reverse and award 
LAUE only the refund of his money paid, plus interest or in the 
alternative sustain the award handed down by the lower court 
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rendered. It could hardly be deemed, as a matter of 
law, that the Court abused its discretion in awarding 
$500.00 rather than $800000 under all the circumstances" 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS LAUB ARE ENTITLED TO AN ORDER 
OF THIS COURT AWARDING APPELLANTS ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEALO 
As LAUB states, an award of an attorney's fee on 
appeal is discretionaryo 
Under the circumstances of this case, the multiple 
appeals and the issues involved, it is respectfully submitted 
that it would not be in the interest of justice to award an 
attorney's fee on appeal to LAUB against the Cross Defendants, 
VERE and ELIZABETH BECKSTROMo 
CONCLUSION 
Cross Defendants, VERE BECKSTR0!1 and ELIZABETH 
BECKSTROM respectfully submit that--in view of his personal 
knowledge and acquaintance '"ith both MARION BECKSTROH and 
VERE BECKSTROM and in view of the constructive knowledge 
of the fact that the record title in the County Recorder's 
office showed MARION BECKSTROM to have a tenancy in common 
interest in the property, and in view of the fact that it 
is almost inconceivable that one in this day would obligate 
himself under a contract to purchase real property without 
making some nominal and traditional investigation into the 
status of the title--that LAUB had a responsibility to deten: 
what the record clearly shmved and to conuuct his affairs 
,· 
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against VERE BECKSTROM in~vor of LAUB, 
DATED this ~day of September, 1977. 
• MacARTHUR HRIGHT, 
Attorney for Cross Defendants 
and Respondan ts 
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